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THE STATE OF FREEDOM IN EUROPE 
 
Conor Gearty 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The attacks by Al-Qaida on New York and Washington on September 11 2001  
produced an immediate response from the European Union despite its relatively 
remote location from the events. Within a day an emergency Council of the EU  
was expressing its ‘horror’ at the atrocities.1 Shortly afterwards a special 
European Council was staged, with various policies being hastily created and just 
as speedily promulgated, the EU quickly casting itself as ‘one of the leading 
partners of the global coalition against terrorism’.2 The Commission president 
Romano Prodi spoke in a Brussels Islamic Centre of the European Council’s ‘full 
solidarity with the American people in the face of terrorist attacks’ before 
rushing to the US to repeat himself in person.3 The European Parliament issued 
its own resolution.4 The steady implementation of a range of counter-terrorism 
initiatives followed in the twelve months immediately following 11 September,5 
since when the powers authorized in these heady counter-terrorist times have 
been methodically followed up by diligent officials. Subsequent attacks, some 
still far afield as in Kenya and Bali but others closer to home (Madrid on 11 
March 2004; London on 7 July 2005; Bulgaria on 18 July 2012; and Paris on 7 
January 20156) have precipitated further, energetic engagement: a 
                                                        
  Professor of Human Rights Law, Director of the Institute of Public Affairs LSE; 
Barrister, Matrix Chambers 
1  See EU Presidency Statement – September 11 Attacks in the US http://eu-
un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_56_en.htm [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
2  EU Response to the 11 September: European Commission Action 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-02-122_en.htm [accessed 8 
September 2015]. 
3 Speech by the President of the European Commission on his Visit to the 
Brussels Islamic Centre, 27 September 2001: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/eu_016.asp [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
4  Available at www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/committees/.../20011108/04a_en.pdf 
 [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
5  See EU Response to the 11 September: European Commission Action, op cit, n 2 
for full details of the ‘effective contribution’ being made by the EU during this 
period. 
6 On the Paris attacks, see D. Bigo, E. Brouwer, S. Carrera, E. Guild, E. Guittet, J. 
Jeandesboz, F. Ragazzi and A. Scherrer, The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy 
Responses to the Attacks in Paris. Towards an EU and Security Agenda (CEPS 
Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No 81, February 2015): 
http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/LSE81Counterterrorism.pdf [accessed 8 
September 2015). 
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comprehensive edited collection by Fiona de Londras and Josephine Doody 
attests to the richness and variety of the field.7  As Christina Eckes notes in her 
survey of one of the main areas of activity, we now have 29 different sanction 
regimes operating within the EU, thirteen of them responses to UN interventions 
but the rest autonomous to the EU.8 Cian Murphy’s monograph likewise traces in 
detail the plethora of measures in the fields of, inter alia, money laundering, data 
retention and warrants of arrest that have flowed under this broad rubric.9 The 
era of EU counter-terrorism has clearly well and truly arrived, fed on a 
dependable diet of recurring atrocity.  
 
But why, or – more specifically – why now?  More than any other region it 
had been Europe that had been exposed to the worst of international terrorism 
in the 1970s and 1980s, Member States that had seen their airports turned into 
killing fields, their cities bombed, a cruise ship hijacked, even one of the world’s 
greatest sporting events made infamous by a spectacular massacre of athletes 
from the wrong country.10 As though this were not enough, many of the old 
common market countries had their own problems with indigenous violent 
subversion – the Red Army Faction in Germany; the CCC in Belgium; the Red 
Brigades in Italy; the Corsican Liberation Front in France – and with new 
members came also new problems – the British and Irish brought the IRA, the 
Spanish ETA.11  And yet about this inferno not merely on the doorstep but within 
the house itself there came barely a murmur from the EU (as it was not then 
                                                        
7 F. de Londras and J. Doody (eds),The Impact, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness of EU 
Counter-Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2015). For the Durham University 
SECILE project see Durham Law School Research Briefing No 14: 
https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/law/research/TheImpactLegitimacyAndEffectiven
essOfEUCounter-TerrorismFindingsandProposals.pdf [accessed 29 September 
2015].  
8 C. Eckes, ‘EU Restrictive Measures against Natural and Legal Persons: From 
Counter-Terrorist to Third Country Sanctions’  (2014) 51 (3) Common Market 
Law Review 869-906. 
9 C. C. Murphy, EU Counter-Terrorism Law Pre-emption and the Rule of Law 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012). 
10 Respectively the attacks in Rome and Vienna airports in 1985 and Athens 
airport in 1973; bombed cities would include London, Paris and Milan, on 
occasions too many to mention; the Achille Lauro cruise ship hijack in 1985; and 
the attack on the Munich Olympics in 1972. For the details see the full account 
from the period of most activity which covers the European situation extensively 
in P. Wilkinson and A. Stewart (eds), Contemporary Research on Terrorism 
(Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987). A critical perspective on the idea 
of ‘international terrorism’ is offered by R. Jackson, L. Jarvis, J. Gunning and M. 
Breen Smith, Terrorism. A Critical Introduction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011). 
11 See the special issue on terrorist movements in Twentieth Century Europe: 
(2007) 14 (3) European Review of History. C. A. Gearty, Terror (London: Faber 
and Faber, 1991) has short accounts of many of the core European movements.  
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called).  The occasional speech by a concerned functionary, some desultory calls 
for action from the European Parliament: little more.12 
 
The change of personality so evident in the response to 2001 is, as Eckes 
has observed, popular with governments which ‘consider the EU in principle 
better placed to adopt not only comprehensive embargoes but also targeted 
sanctions’.13 Even the British are positive.14 What is different about the present 
times of course is that there is a ‘constitutional’ base for engagement in this 
arena: for example, the extension of the sanctions regime to reach ‘natural or 
legal persons and groups or non-state entities’.15 Here is where the reasons for 
the new energy become apparent: it opportunistically (in a non-pejorative 
sense) follows the sovereign move which was begun by the treaties on the 
European Union and the European Communities at Maastricht in 1992 and on 
which the later Lisbon treaty was built. 16 We are no longer a disparate collection 
of institutions is the message; rather now we are a state, and with statehood 
comes new kinds of responsibilities. Having secured the liberty of Europe, we 
must now guarantee our people’s security: policing, arresting, intelligence-
gathering, and when it is needed ‘counter-terrorism’.   The early 1990s was 
exactly a time when it was perhaps forgivable to have such hubristic visions, and 
the 2001 attacks provided an unmissable opportunity for pushing towards their 
realisation in a particular and important aspect, for making constitutional noise.  
The various initiatives that flowed after the attacks drove integrationist efforts 
along strongly in these various policing and related spheres, counter-terrorism 
the Trojan horse arriving at Member State capitals, full of integrationist warriors 
hidden within. 
 
As we all now know, sovereignty was a stretch too far for Europe, and 
even so stark a crisis as that precipitated by the events of 11 September 2001 
could not make possible things that were bound not to be. It might have been 
feasible at an earlier time but then, even if it had been realisable, it had not been 
thought necessary. Now, whether necessary or prudent or neither, it was no 
                                                        
12 S. Peers, ‘EU Responses to Terrorism’ (2003) 52 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 227-243 briefly covers the slight pre-2001. 
13 Eckes, op cit, n 8 at 872.  
14 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Review of the Balance of Competences 
between the United Kingdom and the EU (Cm 8415, July 2012). The Review’s 
progress and reports can be viewed at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/review-of-
the-balance-of-competences [accessed 9 September 2015]. For the Foreign 
Policy report dealing with sanctions see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi
le/227437/2901086_Foreign_Policy_acc.pdf [accessed 9 September 2015].  
15 Article 215(2) Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN [accessed 8 
September 2015]. 
16 Article 301 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12002E301:EN:HTML:acce
ssed [accessed 8 September 2015] is the predecessor to Article 215. 
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longer feasible, an attempt to hook on to a supranational sovereign dream just 
when that ideal had begun irretrievably to fade.  The reaction to 11 September 
damaged the liberty of those living in Europe who found themselves targeted as 
suspect terrorists while seeming to do little to ensure the security of the wider 
community.  It also reintroduced into the European thinking the dangerous idea 
of an (ongoing) emergency, a state of affairs of crisis rather than a one-off 
catastrophe. More recently a second emergency, rooted this time in the financial 
and economic collapse of 2008 onwards, has caused the further unraveling of the 
constitutional project and even threatened the gains of past generations of 
European idealists. Member states are resurgent; a cowed Europe fits itself 
around the plans of its most powerful national limbs; Brussels has shown itself 
not beyond the placing of its institutions at the disposal of state capitals and 
international capital.17 The results are clear: life chances are diminished; 
democratic participation is dissipated; the human security offered to millions in 
‘misbehaving Member States’ is truncated. Already battered by the response to 
11 September, one of Europe’s greatest (and it was once thought enduring) 
achievements – its commitment to rule by and of law – is now near almost being 
casually thrown to one side when this or that situation of exigency demands. The 
once noble ambition of universal freedom descends into the policed chaos of 
inequality. 
 
The legacy of these two waves of emergency in Europe is a ‘Union’ that 
not only has not successfully secured personal security within the rule of law but 
has also  latterly (the legacy of 2008) increasingly disowned any broader social 
obligations that should flow from a wider, more social, reading of what ‘security’ 
entails, a reading which should be (and was designed to be) a key aspect of the 
Union’s sovereign dreams.  This evisceration of any rich understanding of what 
security in Europe entails has been of necessity accompanied by a sharp attack 
on liberty, not only on the basic rights and freedoms of those judged to be 
‘security’ threats in the narrowest (‘counter-terrorist’) meaning of the term but 
also, more and more, against those who would resist the trend towards the 
desecurization of Europe’s people that has been such a feature of the region in 
the years since the financial and economic crises engulfed the region.  The result 
is a Europe ostensibly committed to liberty and security that in practice delivers 
neither: a place that preaches security without delivering it, that is rooted in a 
commitment to freedom that on closer examination is not to be found. Facades 
like this serve a purpose – they preserve an appearance of continuity while the 
furniture within is being moved around, lulling passers-by into the belief that, 
despite the sounds of change within, all remains the same: hypocrisy protects us 
from knowing what we know we do not want to know. Whether one calls this a 
‘neo-democratic’18 or ‘post democratic’19 or something equally bleak matters less 
than the obligation to understand it fully.  And for that – to know where are now 
and so where we might be going – we must revisit where we have come from.    
 
 
                                                        
17 Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, Case C-370/12. 
18  C. A. Gearty, Liberty and Security (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013). 
19  C. Crouch, Post-Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004). 
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ORIGINS 
 
The six states that came together in the 1950s to create what became the 
European Union ‘had little sovereignty to lose.’20  In its first framing the idea of 
liberty in this emerging European entity was fairly modest, amounting to not 
much more than the securing of a ‘genuinely free trade area’.21  It was through 
‘the creation of a single market, [that] it was intended to stimulate growth in 
trade and production’.22 Even this version of liberty as the throwing away of 
constraints on freedom of action was always heavily qualified by realpolitik, in 
particular the ‘network of protective agreements and indirect subsidies put in 
place at France’s bidding’ which ‘was altogether out of keeping with the spirit 
and institutions of the international trading system that had emerged in the 
decades following Bretton Woods’23 and of which the common market aspects of 
the new organization were such an exemplar. (More on these institutions later.)  
The ‘liberty’ of the ‘Common Market’ had no republican hue, its parliamentary 
assembly being filled with national nominees rather than directly elected 
representatives of the people. Nor was it much interested in human rights – to 
the extent that these were to emerge in the 1960s it was by way of a defensive 
European jurisprudence against feelings of national judicial superiority.24 The 
law (and its wider more ambitious sibling ‘the rule of law’) was something that 
mattered for the regulation of the markets, not the betterment of people’s lives.  
These various richer versions of what liberty entailed – liberty as political 
freedom; liberty as the equal right of all to lead full and successful lives - were 
the responsibility of the Member States. Safely reposed there, they were driven 
by the wider US-inspired move towards the development of a social Europe that 
made the democratic capitalism of the post-war period seem normal to those 
who knew of no other way of life. ‘What Marshall aid did … was allow European 
States to continue along a path of industrial expansion and investment in heavy 
industry down which they had already started, while at the same time putting 
into place a costly but politically essential welfare state.’25 Thus in post-war 
reconstruction while ‘the notion of social citizenship was a decisive 
breakthrough’26 it was not one that was sought to be delivered outside the nation 
states. The real action was within the domestic sphere: as Wolfgang Streeck 
                                                        
20  T. Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945 (London: Pimlico Press, 2007), 
at 158. 
21  R. C. Mowat, Ruin and Resurgence 1939-65 (London: Blandford Press, 1966), at 
243. 
22  C. E. Black, R. D. English, J. E. Helmreich, P. C. Helmreich, A. James McAdams, 
Rebirth: A Political History of Europe Since World War II 2nd edn (Boulder 
Colorado: Westview Press, 2000), at 115. 
23  Judt, op cit, n 20, at 309. 
24 See A. O’Neill, EU Law for UK Lawyers (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) ch 6 is a 
good account.  
25  W. I. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe. The Turbulent History of a Divided 
Continent (London: Profile Books, 2003), at 134. 
26 G. Eley, ‘Corporatism and the Social Democratic Movement: The Postwar 
Settlement, 1945-73’ in D. Stone (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European 
History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 37-59 at 45. 
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observes  ‘in the years immediately after the Second World War, it was a widely 
shared assumption that, for capitalism to be compatible with democracy, it had 
to be subject to extensive political control so as to protect democracy from 
having to be constrained in the name of free markets.’27 ‘Europe’ was an outrider 
to all of this.  
 
What it could be proud off, though, was its central role in security.28 The 
very first incarnation of Europe, the European Coal and Steel Community, made 
(in the famous words of the French foreign minister Robert Schuman) a future 
Franco-German war ‘not only unthinkable but materially impossible.’29 The 
Euratom agreement on atomic energy was designed with the same view in mind, 
and the success of these two initiatives made the grander coming together of the 
Common Market possible.  By now secure against each other, the six member 
proto-community was also very much part of the US-inspired protection of 
western Europe against the Soviet threat from the East.  Armies were of course 
available, drawn from other arrangements,30 but the European Communities had 
a proper role to play (in tandem with the Bretton Wood financial institutions and 
the nation states themselves) in the defence of what was taking shape as a new 
kind of democratic (and therefore inhibited) capitalism against rival visions of 
how the world should look. In this early guise Europe’s conceptualization of 
security was as limited as it was important: the protection of a space from the 
violent destruction of war delivered personal security from such personal 
catastrophe to millions, but it did not aspire to do more with their lives than 
achieve this powerful negative. The terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s was not a 
priority to those proud of having secured their peoples against the mutually 
assured destruction of war, whether it be nuclear or conventional.  
 
Success often brings discontent with the status quo that has produced it. 
The functionalism of the market-driven approach of the Common Market 
delivered such strides that this small fellowship of nations found itself quickly 
growing (from six to nine in 1973; from nine to twelve by 1986; 28 today31), 
becoming what it would call without embarrassment first a European Economic 
Community and then (from 1992) a European Community (within a European 
Union), and later simply a European Union. The institutions of the three 
communities came together as early as in 196532 and an agreed single market 
                                                        
27 ‘The Crisis in Context: Democratic Capitalism and its Contradictions ‘in A. 
Schäfer and W. Streeck (eds), Politics in the Age of Austerity (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2013), 262-286 at 264 (footnotes omitted).  
28 Helpful to the conceptualization of security that follows is P. Hein, ‘Four 
Concepts of Security; A Human Rights Perspective’ (2013) 13 (1) Human Rights 
Law Review 1-23. 
29 Quoted in T. Buchanan, Europe’s Troubled Peace: 1945-2000 (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2006), at 67. 
30 Pre-eminently of course the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, established in 
1949: http://www.nato.int/ [accessed 11 September 2015]. 
31 See http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/ [accessed 13 
September 2015]. 
32 The Treaty of Brussels 1965. 
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achieved in the 1980s drove transactional unity further into the realms of 
everyday European life.33 As this brand of freedom grew, a democratic ambition 
became increasingly part of its promoters’ goals: the sturdy assembly of national 
worthies evolved into a European Parliament that became directly elected and 
whose powers inevitably increased thereafter as its members asserted their 
‘democratic’ legitimacy in this new ‘Republican’ Europe.34  The social Europe 
agenda of the Delors Commission of the late 1980s and early 1990s was of a 
piece with this ambitious expansionism, adding a commitment to the flourishing 
of Europe’s people where once there had been concern only for their (often 
merely theoretical, given inequality of resources) capacity to trade. The 
highpoint of such an emphasis on the realization of the human potential of all – 
embracing thick readings of both liberty and security35 - invariably takes 
contemporary shape in the form of human rights obligations, and these duly 
came along in Europe too, in the form of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
legally binding with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon 2009, a 
document that as early as its second perambulatory paragraph showed how far 
the project had come: 
 
‘Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the 
indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it 
is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the 
individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the 
Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice.’ 36 
 
How had Europe become able to tell such grand stories about itself with a 
straight face? Going with the groove of the 1990s fashion for globalization, the 
Union was able to think of itself as a sub-global regional entity in a world fast 
becoming post-national.37 The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 led to the 
states of central and eastern Europe turning their faces now no longer east but 
west. What they saw when they made the switch was not one hegemonic power 
but rather a series of sub-powers welded together in an organization of 
supranational force that seemed to have cracked the contradictions they and 
their peoples had all been taught were bound to blow their old western 
                                                        
33  See http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/index_en.htm [accessed 13 
September 2015]. 
34 There is a good clear account at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.3.1.pdf [accessed 13 
September 2015]. 
35  For more on which see Gearty, Liberty and Security, op cit, n 18. 
36 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT&from=EN [accessed 13 
September 2015]. For a clear web site on the charter see  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm 
[accessed 13 September 2015].  
37 Anthony Gidden’s BBC Reith lectures for 1999 on our Runaway World, five 
different talks across five international locations, capture the energy and 
ambition of the time: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/events/reith_99/ 
[accessed 16 September 2015].    
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opponent apart, ‘capitalism with a human face,’38 or as the last Soviet leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev had touchingly thought was possible for his own country, 
Swedish-style social democracy.39 The broadening of the EU remit at this time 
made it – not the nation states as had been the case in the decades before – the 
front-runners in the race to lead the continent in the new order that the end of 
the Cold War necessarily entailed: 
 
‘In the brief aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the idea of the co-
originality and co-evolution of democracy and capitalism took hold of our 
collective imagination, a marriage that signified, on some accounts, no less than 
the end of history itself.’40 
 
So it was natural to seize the counter-terrorist agenda, among others. But there 
was trouble ahead, rooted in the past. 
 
VIRUSES 
 
The international changes that made seemingly irresistible the increased role of 
the European Union both in the affairs of its own countries and in the world at 
large also unleashed forces that proved able both to resist and subvert the 
achievement of this community on a grander scale. There from the very start, 
these antagonistic presences have grown from being (mere) aggravations on the 
margins to occupying a series of central stages, forcing Europe to bend to their 
will, and in the process translating the noble ambitions of the Union’s democratic 
capitalism into something darker, more divisive – a place where behind the 
appearances, beneath the camouflage of ‘identity’, ‘principles’ and ‘human rights’, 
liberty (in all its guises) is being eroded and security is morphing into an 
assumption for the affluent and a distant dream for everybody else.   
 
Three such viruses can usefully be identified.  The first and most obvious 
(which needs here only the briefest  of acknowledgements) is the resurgence of 
what globalization was supposed to have rendered old hat, nationalism. Having 
experienced a 1990s marked by the Balkan wars, it is hard now to force the mind 
back into the post-Westphalian dreams of the late 80s and early 90s. Of course 
national identity had grown as an issue as the EU expanded past its original war-
exhausted membership: British leaders brought talk of ‘I want my money 
back!’41, the Irish concerns about what they called the ‘rights of the unborn’, and 
                                                        
38 S. Brittan, Capitalism with a Human Face  (Aldershot and Lyme, NH: Edward 
Elgar, 1995). 
39 W. Zimmermann, Ruling Russia: Authoritarianism from the Revolution to Putin 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), at 196-197. 
40  M. A. Wilkinson, ‘Politicising Europe’s Justice Deficit: Some Preliminaries’ in D. 
Kochenov, G. deBúrca and A. Williams (eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit (Hart: 
Oxford, 2015), 111-135 at 121 (citing F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the 
Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992)). 
41 Attributed to UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in relation to a dispute 
about VAT in the 1980s: there is a nice short film capturing the mood generated 
by her long political presence at 
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even before the membership acceleration of the two decades after 1989, the 
protocols and declarations that littered the Treaty on European Union (signed at 
Maastricht in 1992) amply demonstrate what had never been entirely absent 
from (remember the French farmers) and what was once again to the fore: the 
national pork-barrel dimension to European negotiation.42 But there was a 
difference between the horse-trading that preceded European agreement on the 
one hand and a determination to favour one’s own state at all costs on the other: 
the former was a prelude to progress (even Mrs Thatcher had signed the Single 
European Act) while the latter had fragmentation as its inevitable effect. That the 
second of these has now risen to such prominence – with arguments for 
withdrawal on the rise and questions of expulsion also being articulated, and 
with the EU Community acting as the organs of states rather than the corporate 
community  – is due to the changes wrought by the two successive emergencies, 
already referred to that have fallen upon the Union ion the first decade of the 
2000s. Nor even then would this first virus have gained its negative strength had 
it not had other negativities to feed off. 
 
The second of our viruses – and driver of the first of these emergency 
moments – is that of religious extremism, or rather more accurately the  ‘fear of 
religious extremism’.  At its inception and for much of its early life, the European 
project was so confidently Christian that the matter needed never to be 
discussed. Of course this was bound to change, not so much because of the 
growth of secularism or even on account of the migration that had always been a 
part of Europe.  The growth of the latter under the impact of globalization did 
mean, though, that by the late 1990s, the editors of a survey of the EU and human 
rights were in no doubt that a chapter was needed on what they identified as the 
issue of ‘The Internal and External “Other” in the Union Legal Order’, subtitled 
‘Racism, Religious Intolerance and Xenophobia in Europe’.43  Why should this 
‘other’ now be mattering so much? By the mid to late 1990s it was clear that 
international power was forcing a new divide to the fore in the world, 
supplanting old Cold War certainties, between fundamentalist (Moslem) and 
non-fundamentalist (Christian? secular? liberal?) worldviews. Certainly the 
Iranian revolution of 1979 had been a shock to Western assumptions of 
(imposed) Middle-Eastern solidarity with its interests, and the rise of proxy-
Iranian forces in the 1980s challenging Israel on the one hand and other ‘stable’ 
Moslem-majority countries on the other kept the subject to the fore in public 
discourse.  Inevitably concerns about fundamentalism took specific shape as a 
reaction to ‘terrorist’ atrocities committed by Islamic fundamentalists, in their 
willed-war against the West, a challenge posed by barbarism to good order and 
                                                                                                                                                              
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzqDh9aB9qY [accessed 15 September 
2015]. 
42 See http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-
making/treaties/pdf/treaty_on_european_union/treaty_on_european_union_en.
pdf [accessed 15 September 2015]. 
43 P. Alston with M. Bustelo and J. Heenan (eds), The EU and Human Rights 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). The chapter of this title was contributed 
by the present author: ch 10. 
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decency.44 (Western marauding in Moslem states was either ignored, justified, or 
most often simply not noticed.45) Similar actions to the Palestinian-related 
violence in European cities in the 1970s and 1980s noted at the start of this 
essay were reconfigured as part not of a liberation struggle but of a wider 
religious Jihad, something of which the actors involved in such attacks were also 
aware and which they too actively promoted.46 Europe’s growing numbers of 
non-Christian peoples were to a great extent Moslem in religious background 
and so caught up to some extent in this new ‘clash of civilisations.’47   
 
The attacks of 11 September 2001 added large amounts of fuel to this 
already ignited but lightly-burning fire. The ‘War on Terror’ demanded by the 
then US President George W Bush was manifested in a series of strong UN 
resolutions48 which even when they bedded down made substantial inroads into 
the assumptions of fairness and due process than had been assumed to be key 
fundamentals of the UN-inspired world order.49 Soon countries were resisting 
the demands of UN human rights bodies on the basis of the overweening 
necessity to combat (as yet still undefined) terrorism.50 Security was demanded 
on behalf of national not regional (much less global) entities. Part of the EU 
reaction, striving to keep up with its energetic, security-conscious state 
governments, has already been noted.  EU implementation of UN demands for 
sanctions and its development of its own parallel sanctions system has led to a 
series of battles with the European Court of Justice which institution has tried 
(with some success) to hold the Community’s executive actors to the standards 
of legality and respect for human rights that have (in theory at least) been among 
its most basic of principles.51 It is without question that so far as some 
                                                        
44 See C. A. Gearty, ‘Human Rights in an Age of Counter-Terrorism’ in C. Miller 
(eds), ‘War on Terror’: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 2006 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2009), at 83-98. 
45 S. Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2000). 
46 F. A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad went Global (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
47 A term made famous by Samuel Huntingdon, originally in S. Huntingdon, ‘The 
Clash of Civilisations’ (1993) 72 Foreign Affairs 22-49. 
48  Starting with UNSC 1373 (2001): 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2012/docs/United%20Nations
%20Security%20Council%20Resolution%201373%20(2001).pdf [accessed 29 
September 2015].  
49 Gearty, Liberty and Security, op cit, n 18 has further details, at 30-49. 
50 For a flavor of the tensions in this area in the mid 2000s see the statement by 
the then Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism,  Martin Scheinin, to the 
Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee on 24 October 2005: 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/rights/2005_10_24_rapporteur.pdf 
[accessed 29 September 2015]. 
51 The Kadi series of cases are key: N. Türküler Isiksel, ‘Fundamental Rights in 
the EU after Kadi and Al Barakat’ (2010) 16 (5) European Law Journal  551-577; 
J. Santos Vara, ‘The Consequences of Kadi: Where the Divergence of Opinion 
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individuals and entities have been concerned, and we can confidently assume a 
shared religious affiliation as Moslem, their liberty has been sharply restricted 
by these Community interventions. The problem goes wider than individual 
injustice. As Christina Eckes has rightly observed, when calling for ‘clearer rules 
and better internal control mechanisms’ for the sanctions regimes, a ‘[u]nion of 
law is … undermined when the Council and the Commission knowingly and 
deliberately continue to adopt measures that are not in compliance with basic 
procedural rights guaranteed by EU law and that, in the event of judicial 
challenge, can be expected to face annulment by the courts.’52 
 
If liberty and the rule of law for suspected Moslems and Islamic-linked 
businesses have been part-casualties of the 11 September reaction to religious 
extremism, another line of engagement driven by the events of that day may 
prove to be even more damaging to universal liberty and security in the medium 
to long term. As is well-known, the US Bush presidency felt empowered by the 11 
September moment to characterize its subsequent military actions in response 
to it as part of the ‘clash of civilisations’ earlier referred to, and the effect of this 
was inevitably further to exacerbate growing tensions between communities, 
both across the world and within specific regions.53 At exactly this time, Europe – 
in search as we have already seen of a constitution that was never to be54 - found 
itself caught up in a furious row about how explicit such a document should be 
about the ‘Christian origins’ of the Community whose values it was seeking to 
encapsulate.55 Though the frontal attack aimed at securing explicit 
acknowledgement of a ‘Christian Europe’ was seen off, it became drearily the 
case that after the 11 September attacks, each subsequent, politically-motivated 
assault on civilians that could plausibly be characterized as Islamic-terrorism led 
to a ratcheting-up of this ‘war of civilisations’ trope, not only in the US and across 
the world but within the EU as well.  The crisis was increasingly becoming not 
about what people did (plant bombs; kill people) but what they said (‘terrorist 
propaganda) and who they were (‘Islamic fundamentalists’).  Having got 
involved in the first place, the Union could hardly avoid falling into line with the 
prevailing US-led discourse: the UN was issuing its own resolutions about 
                                                                                                                                                              
between EU and International Lawyers Lies’ (2011) 17 (2) European Law Journal 
252-274. For a defence of both Kadi decisions see C. A. Gearty, ‘In Praise of 
Awkwardness: Kadi in the CJEU’ (2014) 10 (1) European Constitutional Law 
Review 15-27. 
52 Eckes, op cit, n 8 above, at 903. 
53 M. B. Salter, ‘The Clash of Civilisations and the War on Terror(ists): An 
Imperialist Discourse’ (2003) 5 (2) and (3) Global Dialogue   [no page refs: 
http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=222 [accessed 21 September 
2015]]. 
54 See http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-
making/treaties/pdf/treaty_establishing_a_constitution_for_europe/treaty_estab
lishing_a_constitution_for_europe_en.pdf [accessed 21 September 2015]. 
55 ‘Christianity bedevils talks on EU unity’ Guardian 25 May 2004: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/may/25/eu.religion [accessed 21 
September 2015].  
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challenging ‘terrorist’ speech56 and the language and actions of domestic political 
leaders were increasingly full of rhetoric of this sort.57   
 
There was also the politics of the last atrocity to ensure that all this 
energy never went off the boil. After the Madrid attacks of 11 March 2004, the 
European Council felt compelled to create a new post of a ‘Counter-terrorism 
Coordinator’58, since when the Union has had its internal advocate for the 
ratcheting up its counter-terrorism profile, similar to that performed by the 
Counter-terrorism committee of the UN Security Council (itself newly created 
after the 2001 attacks).  With all necessary laws in place, all security budgets 
well-spent and yet with occasional acts of politically-motivated violence still 
occurring, over time the international focus has increasingly come to be on not 
fighting terrorism as such so much as on countering the ‘extremist’ views that 
are said to make terrorist action more palatable, and therefore (received wisdom 
increasingly stridently maintains) more likely.  A UN Security resolution of 24 
September 2014 identifying as a special concern ‘terrorist acts … motivated by 
intolerance or extremism’ and calling for action against ‘violent extremism’ and 
‘radicalization’59 was enthusiastically taken up by the current Counter-terrorism 
Co-ordinator Gilles de Kerchove (a long-standing EU civil servant, in this post for 
eight years), leading to discussion papers, declarations by the EU Council and 
further revisions of the already wide-ranging EU strategy for combating 
radicalization and recruitment to terrorism.  
 
Thus, and following this new trend to the letter, after the Paris attacks in 
January 2015, the European Council committed itself to a course of action aimed 
at ‘preventing radicalization and safeguarding values’ that involved the 
development of ‘communication strategies to promote tolerance, non-
discrimination, fundamental values and solidarity throughout the EU, including 
through … narratives to counter terrorist ideologies.’60 A Commission paper 
setting out the ‘European agenda on Security’ duly followed, confirming the 
elision that is now taken for granted between ‘fighting terrorism and 
radicalisation’61 and calling for the establishment of a ‘European Counter-
                                                        
56  UN SC Resolution 1624: 
http://www.mofa.go.kr/mofat/htm/issue/policyplanning/UNSCR_1624.pdf 
[accessed 29 September 20-15]. 
57  See Gearty, Liberty and Security, op cit, n 18, at 72-73 (President Bush) and 98 
(Tony Blair). 
58  Declaration on Combating Terrorism, Brussels 25 March 2004, para 14: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/796
37.pdf [accessed 21 September 2015]. 
59 UN SC Resolution 2178: http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11580.doc.htm 
[accessed 21 September 2015]. 
60 Statement by Members of the European Council 12 February 2015, para 2: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150212-
european-council-statement-fight-against-terrorism/ [accessed 21 September 
2015]. 
61  COM (2015) 185 final, at para 3.1: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-
library/documents/basic-documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf 
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Terrorism Centre’ within Europol.62 As with equivalent domestic interventions, 
crackdowns on free speech are made on the basis of assertions about 
connections that are never properly sourced, the Commission paper simply 
asserting (without citation) that ‘[e]xtremist propaganda has been shown to lead 
foreign terrorist fighters from Europe to travel abroad to train, fight and commit 
atrocities in combat zones, and to threaten the internal security of the EU on 
their return.’63  Similar to all international and domestic initiatives along the 
same lines, the EU language used is at pains to present these interventions as 
rooted in respect for equality and diversity, and therefore seemingly entirely 
blind to the religious beliefs of those adversely affected by them. Equally 
obviously the effect is felt in one ‘suspect community’ rather than any other: it is, 
after all, Islamic violence and ‘Islamic’ extremism that has driven this agenda, not 
that of Anders Breivik or the many Neo-Nazi movements that continue to hold 
significant minorities in thrall to their ideology across Europe.   The press release 
noting the newly-created EU-inspired ‘Victims Day’ recalls only the victims of 
Moslem attacks in its opening statement.64  This inevitably follows from the way 
the language of terrorism and counter-terrorism is constructed; focusing only on 
subversive violence conventionally understood as terrorist rather than racist 
violence or hate crimes or (mere) murderous criminality, and ignoring 
equivalent conduct by military forces (other than to justify it as ‘counter-
terrorism’). The whole discourse favours established power and conventional 
wisdom. No doubt this explains its success. But its effect is to drive a wedge 
between European peoples while ostentatiously claiming not to. At least the 
European parliament notices the point when it condemns, in its comment on the 
EU security strategy, ‘any analysis that leads to confusion between terrorism, 
insecurity, Islam and migrants’.65 But Europe is learning that there are subtler 
ways of ensuring Europe’s Christian superiority than merely declaring it to be so. 
 
Does the European Parliament matter anymore anyhow?  This might 
seem a counter-intuitive question given the expansion of its powers that were 
earlier noted.  But the question takes us to the third and in many ways most 
devastating of the viruses that has eaten away not only at the physical health but 
also at the soul of Europe, in many ways the worst of all because the least 
                                                                                                                                                              
[accessed 21 September 2015]. The strategy has been approved by the Justice 
and Home Affairs Council of the EU: for further details see EU Council 9798/15 
10 June 2015: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9798-2015-
INIT/en/pdf [accessed 21 September 2015]. The European Parliament is also on 
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http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-
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62 Com (2015) 185 final, at para 3.1. 
63 Com (2015) 185 final, at para 3.1. 
64  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-15-4580_en.htm 
[Accessed 21 September 2015].  
65 European Parliament Resolution of 9 July 2015 on the European Agenda on 
Security, para 31: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-
2015-0269&format=XML&language=EN [accessed 21 September 2015]. 
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controllable, feeding off the first two while also giving them strength: Europe’s 
collusion in capitalism’s effort to shed its democratic constraints. 
 
THE  NEO-LIBERAL VIRUS 
 
In a dispiriting sort of way, neo-liberalism can be not implausibly viewed as a 
return to the original common market mission, now allowed to run riot.  The 
European project began to thrive when its Treaty of Rome in 1957 instituted the 
drive towards the greater and greater capacity of commercial entities within 
national states to trade with each other across borders.  True, special deals 
existed, as we have seen, but the momentum was towards ever fewer 
restrictions on deal-making. There was a European intellectual background to 
such a strong market orientation as well, in the Ordoliberalism of the Freiburg 
school, the embedding of the market ‘in a “constitutional” framework’66 that 
grew in the mind and work of Frederick Hayek into the assertion that the state 
does not need even to play a role in preserving competition, that the market can 
look after itself even in this regard.67  The German Ordoliberals who were so 
dominant after the Second World War never went this far however and like Karl 
Schmitt before them ‘they never believed in a market economy independent 
from state authority.’68  The Hayekian version secured an upper hand in Anglo-
American versions of liberalism from which the state-phobic neo-liberalism that 
became such a feature of public policy from the 1980s began to emerge. 
Wolfgang Streeck has identified the late 1960s as the time when the post war 
settlement between democracy and capitalism began to fall apart with capitalism 
leading the way (to the amazement of those on the left which had taken its 
captivity by democracy for granted) in reconfiguring the markets’ relationship 
with the popular will. On Streeck’s analysis efforts by capital to remain within 
democratic frameworks have been unsustainable for years, driving the system 
from crisis to crisis. 69 With the events of 1989, capital founded itself needing to 
worry less than ever about its forced reconciliation with democracy: no longer 
did business feel the compulsion to worry that workers (in the US but Europe 
too) might be ‘viewing [a] now globally influential socialist system as an 
appealing model’.70  Those days were gone, and with them any pressing need to 
placate the people.  What the army and police had done before they could do 
again. 
 
 Social Europe resisted the lure of neo-liberalism - the inherent rightness 
(indeed obviousness) of the market solution – longer and more effectively than 
                                                        
66  D. J. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting 
Prometheus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), at 232. 
67 Gerber, op cit, n 66, at 236-7. 
68 W. Streeck, ‘Heller, Schmitt and the Euro’ (2015) 21 (3) European Law Journal 
361, at 363.  
69  W. Streeck, Buying Time. The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (London: 
Verso, 2014).  cf C. Crouch, The Strange Non-Death of Neo-Liberalism (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2011). 
70 D. M. Kotz, The Rise and Fall of Neoliberal Capitalism (Camb Mass: Harvard 
University Press 2015), at 61. 
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many of its constituent national parts. The chipping away continued through the 
first years of the 2000s, however, and took on a renewed vigour after the 
economic and banking crises of 2008 when a new term strode to the fore to do 
market-service: 
 
‘The pro-austerity position was accompanied by a reinterpretation of the causes 
of the crisis by neoliberal economists. To most observers it appeared that the 
private sector had self-destructed. However this was contrary to neoliberal 
theory, which insists that a capitalist economy is inherently stable and that 
serious problems can originate only from mistaken state actions.’71 
 
The resurgence of national interests that forced themselves (as drivers of 
neo-liberalism) onto the EU negotiating table after 2008 did so against a 
background of emergency, but now of an economic rather than counter-terrorist 
nature. The precise nature of the actions taken is too well-known to warrant 
much further description here: the initiatives of the various troikas;72 the fiscal 
compact and European Stability Mechanism that de facto amended EU law;73 and 
the devastating impact of such changes on weaker EU states such as Greece.74 As 
Scheuerman observes, ‘Since the 2008 global economic crisis, elite-level rhetoric 
has repeatedly focused on the existence of a panoply of urgent exceptional 
threats in order to legitimize measures “contravening established procedures 
and norms” as necessary, unavoidable and therefore intrinsically rational.’75  
Furthermore, ‘[t]he crisis has allowed European political leaders to forge what  
in many respects constitutes a new – and more neoliberal – European order.’76 
As the intellectual Godfather of the European project has ruefully observed, 
‘[h]ere, the executive, as always in times of crisis, felt compelled to empower 
itself’77 The national interests being promoted have been those of the market, 
driving change through the EU: ‘it is now finally fair to say that owing to the 
Union’s impact on budgetary planning, there is no “nucleus of sovereignty” left to 
Member States’.78 Europe has proved to be too liberal in its origins to be able to 
resist the assault of market common-sense on its social side, its roots always in 
                                                        
71 Kotz, op cit, n 70, at 168. See M. Blyth, Austerity. The History of a Dangerous 
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 16 
bettering the self rather than in growing a better life out of solidarity. Liberalism 
has long been vulnerable to being mustered by conservatism in support of the 
market ‘against the solidaristic bonds of community that were perceived to 
deform it’, and so it has proved to be in the hands of Europe’s national 
leadership.79 Michael Wilkinson reminds us of a disturbingly apposite 
intervention from the past: ‘The authoritarian liberal, Heller remarks 
contemptuously, fights against the welfare state with one hand “whilst 
subsidizing large banks, large industry, and large agricultural enterprise” with 
the other.’80 ‘Ordoliberalism, in tune with its neoliberal cousin, “has more 
confidence in the economic constitution than in democracy”’.81   
 
 In the years since 2008 it has been under cover of this second emergency 
that democratic forms in Europe (already hardly strong despite the Republican 
enhancements of the European Parliament described earlier) have been 
truncated just as had been personal liberty following the first emergency 
sparked by the attacks of 11 September.82  It may be going too far to say that 
‘while its exterior forms are still in place, its inner core has been eaten away’83 
but there has certainly been a ‘hollowing out’ of EU democratic institutions, to 
use Peter Mair’s famous metaphor.84  As the authors of a recent study have 
observed with disturbing precision, ‘the EU responses to the crisis have 
exhausted the main democratic legitimacy sources of the EU polity’.85 While 
states have had at least the potential (grossly under-used so far) to muster 
opposition to domestic change, Europe in contrast is ‘not buttressed even 
nominally by a comprehensive popular collectivity’  with the result that the ‘[t]he 
logic of rescue programmes, such as the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) 
and European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is not to protect European solidarity, 
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identity or mutual recognition but economic-systemic stability.’86    The dreary 
impact of these changes at national as well as EU level is summed up well by 
Streeck: 
 
‘Today’s post-democratic, or better perhaps a-democratic, Hayekian capitalism, 
after the victory, or almost-victory, of neo-liberalism, may be regarded as an 
historically updated version of ordoliberalism…. As democratic politics is in the 
process emptied of political-economic content, the vacated public sphere is re-
dedicated to consumerist politainment.’87 
 
While we might not be unduly surprised by the attack on democracy 
mounted by capital, an unexpected casualty of the neoliberal surge has been the 
law. Ordinarily one would expect law to be an irreducible guarantor of the 
stability that a contract-oriented market state needs. But the damage done to due 
process and the rule of law by the EU response to economic and banking crises 
has been in many ways more serious because more widely felt than the 
truncation of due process that followed the 11 September attacks.88 That the 
‘legal basis for the actions by the European Institutions, the ECB and the 
European Commission, is debatable’89 puts the point rather mildly, with the 
same author more emphatic in asserting later in the same essay that ‘[i]n 
participating in the conclusion of the MoUs, the European Commission and the 
ECB have infringed Union law’.90 The Pringle case stands as a warning to those 
who would seek to hold the EU institutions within the bounds of the EU.91 
Looking at the legal position in the round, Wilkinson is surely justified in 
asserting that ‘[l]iberal legality has been replaced with authoritarian 
manageralism’.92 To throw an even bleaker light on this, the Member States 
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continue themselves to head along the same route, some moving even faster than 
the EU.93 
 
With democratic and legal safeguards under pressure, the barriers 
defending social Europe have been weakened to the point where they are no 
longer able effectively to resist the pressures on social Europe, and this has led to 
the human rights of many of its citizens (but especially those in the states that 
have been the main victims of austerity) being largely ignored. Even somewhat 
‘grudging and limited’94 at their inception, the socio-economic rights of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights are at risk of becoming what one (albeit harsh) 
critic has described as ‘an empty rhetorical promise’.95 Looking at the field as a 
whole, another writer has heralded ‘the death of social Europe.’96 While it is true 
that the Charter has not been available as a ‘vehicle of constitutional justice’97 for 
very long, and that ‘it is notoriously difficult to track down evidence of judicial 
shifts,’98 the temptation is to say simply look around you and report what you 
see99 - ‘the world turned upside down’ as one Gramscian commentator has 
suggested.100 
 
If socio-economic rights have been reduced to shadows of their former 
selves, what of civil and political rights?  The area is not one in which the EU has 
a traditional primacy. So far as the states are concerned, there has been a 
temptation to deploy the emergency powers designed to counter terrorism so as 
to curb dissent against the havoc caused by the imposition of harsh, austerity-
based policies.101 The EU has not had the capacity (and surely not had the 
inclination) to engage in the same level of repressive control, much less follow 
the logic of liberal authoritarianism into true coercion: ‘European economic and 
monetary crisis management has not yet resorted to banning political parties or 
relied on marauding black shirts, aggressive storm troopers, the removal of 
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unwanted people or the shutdown of constitutional courts.’102 The engaged 
citizen is caught in a bind: ‘While resistance against EU policies is pointless at 
home, it is largely homeless in the Union.’103 Civil and political rights are 
guaranteed because they can never be exercised; social and economic rights are 
guaranteed because they will not be realized. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE STRUGGLE FOR HEALTH 
 
What resources does Europe in general and the European Union in particular 
have to resist a world in which ‘[c]ore democratic institutions, such as 
parliaments or recurring elections, stay formally in place while the substance of 
political decision making is no longer determined by active citizens and their 
representatives’104? And we should add while the law comes and goes as neo-
liberal exigencies demand, and human rights rhetoric grows ever louder as its 
real impact on the ground diminishes ever further?  Pushing the point even 
more, is it right that ‘one cannot but be afraid of the possibility of a new, however 
temporary, settlement of social conflict in advanced capitalism, this time entirely 
in favour of the propertied classes now firmly entrenched in their politically 
unconquerable institutional stronghold, the international finance industry’?105 Is 
this what has become of the noble European dream, not now the preventer of 
wars and the deliverer of a rich version of liberty and security for all, but rather 
the regional servant of privilege, one that is these days quite incapable of issuing 
moral instructions to badly behaving member states with a straight face, its own 
hypocrisy now so extreme that it is impossible to conceal?106  
 
The literature gives us a choice of ways of describing this state of affairs, 
my own ‘neo-democracy’,107 but also ‘imitation democracy’,108 ‘post-
democracy’,109 ‘authoritarian legality’110 and – already noted – ‘ordoliberalism’, 
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with ‘its indifference if not outright hostility towards democracy as a way of 
life’.111 Is it all inevitable; have the viruses killed the patient?  There is pushback 
in the courts from time to time, Kadi being a good example so far as the field of 
due process/civil rights is concerned,112 and there are also those decisions which 
have from time to time shown that there is at least some bite in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.113 The Strasbourg court can also still do some occasionally 
valuable work,114 just as the European Parliament may be relied upon to raise 
the issues of democratic engagement that are missed elsewhere, indeed can 
sometimes manage the occasional bite despite the leash on its powers severely 
curtailing its movement.  Social movements do influence public debate as well.115 
The fact that for many the best way of moving forward is to rely on the 
democratic energy of ‘the people’ may be evidence of despair or determined 
optimism, or indeed both.116  The refugee crisis that burst fully onto Europe in 
2015 may be the final straw for the Union, the point at which the three viruses of 
national selfishness, racist intolerance and the decay of life-chances produced by 
neo-liberalism the world over come together in a perfect and destructive storm.  
It is to be hoped that this is not the case, and that the horrors of this period are 
that high point when the patient, in the worst of the fever, is on the way to 
recovery, towards a ‘pan-European social democracy.’117  Optimism of the will is 
vital exactly when the intellect sees no escape from pessimism. 
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